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Abstract 
Individuals’ pro-social behaviors are driven by 
altruistic and selfish motivations. In this paper we 
explore how the introduction of external incentives 
would influence one’s pro-social behavior both in the 
short term and in the long run. Using a large data set 
on Amazon product reviews, we design a quasi-
experimental approach where we combine a 
propensity score matching (PSM) and a difference-in-
differences (DiD) method to empirically study the 
effect of incentive provision on reviewer’s behavior. 
We apply techniques from linguistics, language 
processing, and machine learning to propose several 
novel measures to capture reviews’ writing style and 
quality. We find evidences consistent with crowding-
out and overjustification effects. Our study contributes 
to the understanding of pro-social behavior and sheds 
light on how incentives would shift individual 
behavior.  
 
1. Introduction 
Human behaviors are fundamentally interesting 
yet extremely complex. We regularly undergo a 
complex decision-making process, balance desires and 
wants, in order to determine our best course of action.  
The classical Homo Economicus paradigm argues that 
individuals tend to act selfishly to maximize their own 
self-interests and private benefits [1, 2]. However, 
numerous research also contends that people are 
inherently altruistic and are capable of showing 
concerns toward others’ welfare [3]. Ample evidences 
of altruistic behaviors have been found in multiple 
disciplines including neuroscience, biology, 
psychology, and economics, with examples such as 
charitable giving and other pro-social behaviors [4, 5, 
6, 7]. 
This mixture of altruism and selfishness can also 
be observed in the realm of information systems.  The 
sustainability of online content sharing platforms such 
as YouTube, Flickr, Wiki, Yelp, and even the review 
community on Amazon relies on users’ voluntary 
contribution. Users on these websites voluntarily 
devote time and effort to contribute knowledge and 
information, also known as user-generated content 
(UGC). While altruism is often credited as the major 
impetus that drives people’s voluntary contribution 
behavior on these platforms, we also observe more 
selfish motivations such as the need for self-
enhancement, external recognition, reputation 
gaining, and social connectedness that prompt 
voluntary contribution online, similar to other pro-
social behaviors [8, 9, 10]. These self-gratification and 
altruistic tendencies together help shape individuals’ 
contribution behaviors [7, 9, 11]. 
Many have attempted to encourage pro-social 
behaviors such as blood donation and charitable giving 
by providing external rewards. Such incentive 
provision strategies are expected to stimulate 
individuals’ reciprocal emotions [12], and induce them 
to behave in a way benefiting the incentive provider, 
such as increasing the contribution level, in return of 
the favorable treatment. However, abundant studies 
find that the incentive can actually backfire to crowd 
out the contributor’s original altruistic and intrinsic 
tendencies for pro-social activities [13, 14, 15,16]. As 
a consequence, individuals will decrease their 
contribution or lower their performance in these pro-
social activities. Moreover, such negative impacts, as 
suggested by psychological theory, involves 
individuals’ internal mindset change and hence can 
persist long enough to generate some overjustification 
effect [16, 17, 18, 19]. It means that individuals 
continue to perform in a low level in subsequent 
activities even when the incentives are no longer 
present.  
The adoption of incentives on those pro-social 
contribution based information systems are not 
unusual and begins to attract academic attention in this 
area. Particularly, Cabral and Li (2015) conducted 
field experiments on eBay and found that users do 
show reciprocity by decreasing the likelihood of 
leaving negative feedback when they receive rebates 
[20]. Other researchers have empirically studied the 
temporary crowding-out effect  and find that reviewers 
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would decrease the average length of reviews or 
increase the numerical rating when they receive 
payments [21, 22, 23, 24]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, none of the extant literature studies the 
incentive’s long-term effect on the reviewer’s 
behavior after the incentive has been later removed.  
Drawing upon psychological and economic 
theories, we develop a series of hypotheses on 
incentives, which may have short-term crowding-out 
effect as well as long-term overjustification effect, in 
the context of review contribution. We then 
empirically test them using a large dataset from 
Amazon online reviews, the leading e-commerce 
platform, which allows consumers to voluntarily and 
pro-socially contribute product reviews. To 
comprehensively understand the reviewer’s 
behavioral change under incentive provision, we 
innovatively analyzed the text structure (lexical 
richness), semantics (topic diversity), and helpfulness 
(peer evaluation) of their reviews through an 
integrated linguistics, language processing, and 
machine learning approach. With these evaluation 
metrics, we specify a series of fixed-effects models to 
examine the influence of incentives on reviewers’ 
behaviors both in the short term and the long term. To 
account for potential endogeneity issues due to 
reviewers’ self-selection, we combine a propensity 
score matching (PSM) and a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) approach to conduct our empirical analysis. 
This enables us to simulate a quasi-experimental 
environment, which will allow us to estimate the 
“treatment effect” of incentive provision on the 
reviewer’s behavior. 
Our empirical results suggest that the provision of 
incentives does affect individuals’ behaviors, both in 
the short term and the long term. This external 
incentive will crowd out the reviewer’s initial altruistic 
and intrinsic motivations. Moreover, the crowding-out 
effect will carry over to the individual’s subsequent 
reviews, which results in the overjustification effect. 
Specifically, we observe that the provision of 
incentives corresponds to an immediate decrease in the 
helpfulness and the lexical richness of the review, 
while an increase in the review’s topic diversity. 
Besides the short-term effect, we are also able to 
analyze reviewers’ long-term behavior change 
induced by incentive provision because our dataset 
contains a given reviewer’s review writing history 
over time. We find evidence consistent with the long-
term overjustification effect where we observe a 
decline in lexical richness among reviewers not 
currently receiving incentives but having received 
incentives in the past. The combination of PSM and 
DiD allows us to make causal arguments regarding 
these behavior changes. These results ought to be 
substantially important for the design of online review 
platforms and other information communities which 
depend on pro-social contributions. Managers on these 
platforms must carefully consider this unintended 
consequence and decide whether or not the provision 
of incentives is the best strategy for the long-term 
development of the platform. In addition, this study 
advances our understanding of pro-social behavior and 
the interplay among altruism, selfishness, and 
incentives. We believe our research should be of 
interest to academics and practitioners interested in 
promoting pro-social behaviors, and we hope to raise 
the awareness of the unintended consequence of the 
incentive provision on both short- and long- term 
behavior change. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Contribution to online review platforms such as 
Amazon and Yelp is a pro-social example where users 
share their opinions and experiences to help others 
search for relevant information and make purchase 
decisions. Meanwhile, they might also be intrinsically 
motivated by the desire for social connectedness, 
uniqueness, self-enhancement, and reputations [10]. 
Therefore, users’ online review contribution is likely a 
result of a combination of altruism and selfishness. 
However, this mixture behavior resulted from 
altruism and selfishness is easily influenced by 
financial incentives [15, 16]. People are inclined to 
make some attributions about the causes of their own 
behavior based on the behavior per se and the 
conditions within which it occurs [17, 25]. When no 
explicit exogenous factors are available, subjects act 
as if their behaviors are intrinsically motivated [15, 19, 
26, 27]. For example, on the review platform, 
reviewers are willing to share their opinions on 
products to help others make purchase decision. They 
will probably attribute their pro-social contribution to 
altruistic attitudes, or some other intrinsic motivations 
such as self-enhancement and enjoyment [7,10]. 
Either altruistic or these intrinsic motivations are 
abstract, only facilitating individuals to find some 
temporary interpretations for their behaviors. Without 
interventions, individuals may continuously 
contribute in the pro-social activities under such 
internal motivations. However, once some exogenous 
factor which can affect the pro-social contribution is 
present, the endogenous interpretations will be diluted. 
This specific external factor will become a salient 
reason for individuals to explain and support their 
behaviors [17, 19, 25, 28]. Back to the review 
platform, if reviewers are provided with some 
financial incentives (e.g., free products or cash back), 
which have been validated as a strong impactor on pro-
social activities, it will undoubtedly be an attention 
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focus in this circumstance. The salience of financial 
incentives will provoke reviewers’ introspect on the 
association of incentives with their behaviors. They 
hence begin to infer the causes of their behaviors in a 
new perspective and have an attributional shift in their 
minds [17, 19]. To this point, the financial incentives 
seem to give a sufficient and reasonable interpretation 
for their pro-social contributions compared with the 
original ambiguous and invisible internal motivations.  
This attributional shift transfers reviewers from a pro-
social context to a monetary framework [28], where 
they consequently decrease the initial motivations 
including altruism and some intrinsic interests. Such 
decrease of altruism and intrinsic motivations induced 
by financial incentives is psychologically defined as 
“crowding-out effect” [13, 15, 26]. Our first set of 
hypotheses concerns the incentive’s crowding-out 
effect on reviewers. Specifically, we suspect that these 
contributors may be less likely to devote effort in 
writing, resulting in a decline in the review helpfulness 
voting and in the quality of the review text itself, as 
reflected in certain measures of lexical richness, which 
is an indicator of writing quality. It is also likely that 
incentivized reviewers might care less about the peer 
readers and thus pay less attention to the objectivity 
and accuracy of the review. As a result, the topic 
diversity covered in the text might become more 
biased. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
H1: (Crowding-out Effect) Reviewers who 
received incentives from the seller would write 
reviews with  biases including: (a) less helpfulness, (b) 
lower quality as reflected in lexical richness, (c) 
significantly different topic diversity, compared with 
reviews given by a reviewer not receiving incentives. 
As mentioned above, it’s not a simple association 
of the extrinsic rewards with the pro-social activity but 
rather the perception of extrinsic incentive salience 
that would be necessary to produce a crowding-out in 
initial internal motivations, i.e., altruism and intrinsic 
satisfactions in pro-social activities. This means that 
individuals update beliefs about their behavioral 
attributions when the incentive provision is present. 
Once incentives are withdrawn, such updated 
perceptual beliefs will not disappear immediately from 
individuals who actually have already been 
overjustified by such incentives [17, 15, 19]. It’s hence 
not surprising that these intangible thoughts derived 
from previous incentives will continue to influence 
individuals’ subsequent behaviors even when the 
incentives are no longer present. Therefore, the 
original motivation to perform the task without 
incentives can be reduced in the long run, leading to 
the “overjustification effect” [17, 18, 19]. Consistent 
evidences of such long-term effects from incentives 
have been found in different studies. For example, 
children who received some expected rewards would 
show less subsequent interest in an attractive drawing 
activity even when the incentives were removed later 
[17]. In a day care experiment, some fine policy was 
enacted to punish parents who were late to pick up 
children. When the fine rule was abolished, parents 
still showed up late and the number of late pick-ups 
even increased [29]. All these examples supported that 
incentives can produce long-term overjustification 
effects on individual behaviors even when the 
incentives are later removed. 
In the current context of a review platform, 
reviewers often post reviews for more than one 
product. It is possible that certain reviewers would 
receive some incentives to write a review for a certain 
product, and at a later point in time write reviews for 
other products without receiving incentives. 
According to the overjustification effect, the 
crowding-out from incentives could still persist and 
influence the reviewers’ behavior in these subsequent 
reviews, which implies that we might still observe 
some difference in the topic diversity, and the writing 
quality of the review text.  Therefore, we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
H2: (Overjustification Effect) Reviewers who have 
received incentives in the past would in later periods 
write reviews with  biases including: (a) less 
helpfulness, (b) lower quality as reflected in lexical 
richness, (c) significantly different topic diversity,  
compared with reviews given by a reviewer not 
receiving incentives. 
 
3. Research Setting and Measurements 
 
3.1. Amazon Online Review 
Amazon, the largest e-commerce platform, allows 
users to leave product reviews, and the provision of 
product reviews is usually voluntary: users typically 
contribute reviews to help other potential buyers 
without receiving any financial rewards. While review 
provision can appear to be a purely altruistic behavior, 
one might be able to establish his/her reputation as a 
respected reviewer as s/he contributes more helpful 
reviews on Amazon. Therefore, this review 
contribution behavior is likely to reflect a combination 
of altruism as well as one’s intrinsic selfish 
motivations to obtain self-enhancement and respect 
from others. Interestingly, in 2007 Amazon launched 
the Amazon Vine Program, through which reviewers 
are eligible to receive free or discounted sample 
products in exchange of writing an honest and 
unbiased product review. The Vine program makes 
Amazon review an ideal platform for us to study 
whether or/and how users might change their behavior 
in response to external financial incentive. Amazon 
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requires such reviews to explicitly disclose in the 
review text that a free/discounted product has been 
received, which allows us to identify reviews that are 
written when the external financial incentive is 
present. To distinguish these reviews from others, we 
label them as “incentivized reviews”. In addition, we 
further label users who have written any incentivized 
review as “incentivized reviewers”. An important fact 
is that an “incentivized user” can still write “non-
incentivized reviews” for other products because the 
Vine program is conducted on a per product basis. 
To explore whether/how the provision of incentive 
would affect individual behavior, we obtain a rich 
dataset which contains Amazon’s product and review 
information for selected product categories from 1997 
to 2014. 1 Our first task is to identify reviews that were 
incentivized. Since reviewers have to disclose the 
receipt of financial incentives in the review text but the 
actual disclosure texts might vary across reviews. We 
consider the problem of incentive identification as a 
text classification task where we classify review texts 
as either incentivized or non-incentivized, and we use 
a powerful machine learning method, random forest 
[30], to identify incentivized reviews: we first recruit 
human evaluator to annotate a subset of review texts 
as either incentivized or non-incentivized. We then use 
the labeled data to grow a random forest with N-gram 
features as inputs, and this random forest classifier 
achieves 92.21% accuracy, suggesting that our 
classifier is satisfactory. This classifier enables us to 
automatically extract incentivized reviews from our 
large dataset. Reviewers who post these incentivized 
reviews are consequently identified as incentivized 
reviewers. We restrict our attention to incentivized 
reviewers who have posted more than ten identified 
incentivized reviews to ensure we are capturing true 
incentivized reviewers. Following this procedure, we 
identify a total of 4118 incentivized reviewers, all of 
whom have written more than 10 incentivized reviews. 
They collectively contributed a total of 1,165,035 
pieces of reviews, of which 191,429 reviews are 
identified as incentivized. We also identify 1,399,384 
reviewers who have never received any incentives but 
post more than 10 reviews per person. These 4,118 
incentivized reviewers and 1,399,384 regular 
reviewers are the focus of our following empirical 
analysis. 
 
3.2. Measurements Development 
Helpfulness: Amazon implements a voting 
mechanism for customers to evaluate others’ reviews, 
which allows us to evaluate reviewers’ contribution 
                                                            
1 We thank Dr. Julian McAuley for generously providing 
this dataset (http://jmcauley.ucsd.edu/data/amazon/ ) 
[31]. We collect this information to calculate the 
helpfulness as ratio of helpful votes among all votes 
which we use as a measure of review quality.  Since 
reviews with high helpfulness are perceived to be 
useful in facilitating purchase decisions [32], a high 
helpful ratio suggests that the review quality is high 
and that the reviewer has exerted some effort in 
writing the review. 
Lexical Richness: We also analyze the structure of 
a review text to evaluate the quality of the writing. The 
linguistic concept, lexical richness, captures the 
degree to which the writer is using a varied and large 
vocabulary [33], and it has been shown to be positively 
related to the quality of written and spoken texts in 
language studies [34]. Texts that have a high level of 
lexical richness are more capable of expressing 
complex ideas, especially when complex ideas are 
combined or interacting with each other [35]. We 
therefore include it as a measure of review quality in 
our analysis. We use a natural language processing 
technique (POS) to parse the reviews and further adopt 
an automated lexical analysis tool, Lexical 
Complexity Analyzer [36] to analyze a review text’s 
lexical richness. 
Topical Diversity: Since a comprehensive 
evaluation of a product is more likely to be helpful, 
another way to measure review quality is to analyze if 
a review text discusses a diverse set of topics: reviews 
that contain a higher number of different topics might 
be more informative and diagnostic in helping users 
make their purchase decision. We use a type of topic 
model, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [37], to 
analyze review texts. This method has been widely 
used in review processing such as to recommend 
helpful information and to extract product attributes. 
Given a specific review, LDA outputs its topic 
distribution. We then apply the concept of Shannon 
entropy to calculate the topic diversity as follows: for 
a given review with a topic distribution of T ={t%, t', … , t)}, we define topic diversity as 
 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 	− 𝑡9 log 𝑡9=9>% .	 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Using the Amazon online review dataset, we 
construct a series of empirical models to test our 
hypotheses to study both the short-term and the long-
term effects of incentive provision on the reviewer’s 
behavior. Here we design a quasi-experimental 
environment which combine the propensity score 
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matching (PSM) technique and the difference-in-
differences (DiD) analysis to address the potential 
self-selection issue.  
 
4.1. Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity score matching (PSM) has become a 
popular quasi-experimental method to estimate 
treatment effects and has been increasingly applied in 
IS research. Here we apply PSM to construct a 
“control group” which consists of reviewers who 
never received any incentives for writing reviews but 
exhibit very similar review contribution pattern and 
writing styles compared with the “treatment group”—
reviewers who did receive incentives—before any 
incentive was provided. The PSM procedure involves 
matching a given treatment user with a similar control 
user based on observable covariates. It is important to 
note that the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) has to satisfy for the treatment effect estimate to 
be valid. This assumption states that the potential 
outcome of the treatment is independent of the 
treatment assignment conditional on observable 
covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, if 
CIA holds, then matching based on propensity score—
the likelihood of receiving treatment—is sufficient 
[38]. In our case, we model the propensity of receiving 
treatment, i.e., incentives, as a function of variables 
that reflect the reviewer’s review writing 
characteristics prior to any incentive provision.   
One challenge specific to our research setup is that 
incentivized-reviewers do not necessarily receive 
incentive at the same time. In other words, there does 
not exist an overall “treatment start time” where all 
treatment users start to receive incentives for review 
writing. This creates an issue for our analysis because 
we need to match treated users with control users prior 
to the “treatment start time” for each user, but none of 
the control users ever received any “treatment” by 
definition, and hence we do not have a well-defined 
“treatment start time” for the control users. Our 
approach to this issue is to conduct a two-stage PSM 
procedure where we first use data from the entire 
period of time (both prior to treatment and after 
treatment) to match treatment users with control users 
who are similar overall. Then, for each control user, 
we assign this control user’s “treatment start time” to 
be the matched treatment user’s “treatment start time”. 
Once all control users have been assigned their 
respective “treatment start time”, we are able to 
conduct our second-stage PSM using only data prior 
to the “treatment start time”, and the second-stage 
PSM gives us the final matches for each treatment 
user. In the subsequent analysis we also conduct 
robustness checks to ensure our assignment of 
“treatment start time” for control users does not 
qualitatively affect our empirical results. The results of 
the robustness checks are available upon request.  
For both stages of the PSM procedure, we perform 
a Nearest Neighboring matching (NN matching), 
which pairs each incentivized reviewer (treatment) 
with the closest non-incentivized (control) reviewer in 
terms of their propensity scores. We specify a logistic 
regression to model each reviewer’s probability of 
being incentivized.  Note the variables used in the 
logistic regression are the review length, numerical 
star rating, helpful ratio, and number of total votes, all 
of which are averaged among all reviews written by a 
given reviewer. We also include measures such as the 
number of reviews, length of tenure on the platform, 
and number of product categories this reviewer has 
reviewed into the regression to reflect additional 
review characteristics. Using these variables, we 
employ a stepwise estimation [39] to specify the final 
propensity score formula. It is important to note that a 
common support of propensity score is required for 
PSM to work properly. Therefore, we discard 
observations which lie outside of the common support 
region based on the Minima and Maxima comparison 
suggested by Caliendo and Kopeinig [40].  Finally, we 
conduct the two-stage PSM procedure using the NN 
method with replacement. 
    
Figure 1.  Distribution of propensity score before 
and after 1st-stage matching 
 
 
5603
6 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of propensity score before 
and after 2nd -stage matching 
To ensure that our matching is successful, we plot 
the distribution of propensity score before and after 
matching between two groups in Figure 1 and Figure 
2. We can see the propensity score distribution of the 
control group after matching is almost identical to that 
of the treatment group, which suggests that matching 
is satisfactory. We further conduct statistical tests and 
conclude that the distributions of all variables are not 
significantly different between control and treatment 
group after each matching. Due to space constraints, 
statistical test results are available upon request. 
 
4.2. Difference-in-Differences Model 
The two-stage propensity score matching 
procedure allows us to simulate a quasi-experiment by 
pairing each incentivized reviewer with a similar non-
incentivized reviewer based on observable covariates. 
To alleviate the concern regarding selection on 
unobservables, we combine the PSM procedure with a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, which 
allows us to also address time-invariant differences in 
unobservables across the treatment and control group. 
Note that we are interested in how the reviewer’s 
overall behavior is affected by incentive provision, 
hence making the results less susceptible to any single 
extreme review that might bias our effect estimates in 
unexpected ways. For each treatment reviewer, we 
first split his/her reviews into those that are written 
before “treatment start time” and those after 
“treatment start time”; for those reviews written after 
the “treatment start time” we further split them into 
those that have been classified as incentivized reviews 
and those that have been classified as unincentivized 
reviews. We call these 3 splits different regimes. Then, 
for each regime we compute the average for each 
variable that will appear in the empirical model below, 
such as HelpfulRatio, LexicalRichness and 
TopicDiversity. Therefore, for each treatment user we 
have 3 regimes: treatment-before-unincentivized, 
treatment-after-unincentivized, treatment-after-
incentivized; similarly, for each control user we will 
have 2 regimes: control-before-unincentivized and 
control-after-unincentivized. Finally, we construct a 
consolidated dataset where each entry is one of the 5 
potential regime levels for a given reviewer, with each 
variable in the entry being the average of the variable 
values across all reviews in this regime.  
Our outcomes of interest are the reviewer’s 
behaviors measured by HelpfulRatio, 
LexicalRichness, TopicDiversity. Recall that 
LexicalRichness and TopicDiversity are direct 
measurements of the reviewer’s own behavior, while 
HelpfulRatio is the peer evaluation of the review 
quality. Considering this difference, we therefore 
specify regime-level models separately for these two 
types of measurements. For measures that directly 
reflect the reviewer’s behavior, we specify the 
following regime-level, fixed-effect DiD model: 𝐷𝑉9A = 𝛼C9 + 𝛼%𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡9A + 𝛼'𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠9A+ 𝛼L𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡9A∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠9A+ 𝛼N𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤9A+ 𝛼Q𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A+ 𝛼W𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠9A+ 𝛼Z𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠9A+ 𝛼\𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒9A + 	𝜀9A, 
where 𝑖  indexes a matched pair of reviewers, and 𝑟 
indexes one of the 5 regime types; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡9A  is the 
treatment dummy variable which equals 1 when the 
reviewer is in the ‘treatment’-regime, and 0 otherwise; 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠9A  is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the observation corresponds to an ‘after’-
regime, and equals 0 otherwise. In other words, this 
dummy variable reflects the difference in the before-
after dimension in the DiD model. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤9A	 is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the observation corresponds to an 
‘incentivized’-regime, and 0 otherwise. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A  represents a vector of 
variables which reflect the reviewer’s reviewing 
behavior including ReviewLength, NumReviews, 
ActiveMonths in the current regime. The purpose of 
including regime-specific variables can be understood 
as controlling for the reviewer’s characteristics in the 
current regime, so we can account for any potential 
difference in the reviewer’s characteristics across 
different regimes. In contrast, we also control for 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠9A , which is a vector 
reflecting a reviewer’s overall characteristics  as 
reflected in all regimes, as opposed to his/her 
characteristics in the current regime. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠9A  denotes the overall 
characteristics of all products for which the reviewer 
has evaluated, including NumCategory, AveragePrice 
and AverageSalesRank. Finally, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒9A  is a year-
fixed effect denoting the year when the reviewer first 
started writing reviews; 𝛼C9′𝑠  are the pair-specific 
fixed effects that capture the baseline differences 
between different matched pairs and enable us to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across different 
pairs of reviewers.  
Recall that we define incentivized users as those 
who have ever written some incentivized reviews, but 
these incentivized users do not always write 
incentivized reviews. Therefore, the variable 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤9A  for a treatment user can be 
either 1 or 0, depending on whether or not the current 
regime is incentivized or not.  In contrast, a control 
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user is by definition unincentivized—never written 
any incentivized reviews—and therefore the variable 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤9A for the control user is always 
0 by definition. Note that our parameters of interests is 
the coefficient, 𝛼L , associated with the interaction 
term, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡9A ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠9A , which 
measures the difference in 𝐷𝑉 between the treatment 
and control group across the ‘before’- and ‘after’-
regimes—prior to or after the “treatment start time”, 
when the incentive is NOT present. In other words, it 
can be shown that 𝛼L reflects the following quantity:  𝛼L= 𝐷𝑉 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑑− 𝐷𝑉 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑− [𝐷𝑉 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑− 𝐷𝑉(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑], 
Which is precisely the definition of the 
overjustification effect due to incentive provision. 
Similarly, it can be shown that the crowding-out effect 
is reflected by the sum of 𝛼L and 𝛼N, where the sum 
reflects the differences in 𝐷𝑉  between a ‘before-
unincentivized’ regime and an ‘after-incentivized’ 
regime—precisely the definition of the crowding-out 
effect. 
We specify a separate model for HelpfulRatio 
because helpfulness votes are cast by peer users and 
are an indirect reflection of the reviewer behavior. We 
include review characteristics variables such as 
LexcialRichness, TopicDiversit, in the model because 
readers are able to observe these features when reading 
the review, so their votes might have been affected by 
these features, either directly or indirectly. Formally, 
we construct the HelpfulRatio model as 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜9A = 𝛼C9 + 𝛼%𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡9A+ 𝛼'𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠9A+ 𝛼L𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡9A∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠9A+ 𝛼N𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤9A+ 𝛼Q𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A+ 𝛼W𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A+ 𝛼Z𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠9A+ 𝛼\𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A+ 𝛼g𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠9A+ 𝛼%C𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒9A + 	𝜀9A, 
where HelpfulRatio is defined as the ratio of helpful 
votes over total votes; 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A is 
a vector containing the average values of the four 
review characteristics variables in the current regime; 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠9A  denotes the average 
values of the four review characteristics variables’ 
across all regimes for the given user; the rest of the 
variables are defined similarly as in the former model. 
 
                                                            
2 That is, 0.0122-0.0138 = -0.016 
5. Model Estimation and Results 
In this section we detail the estimation results of 
our models specified to study the effect of incentive 
provision and test our hypotheses on the crowding-out 
and overjutification effects. 
 
5.1. Helpful Ratio Model 
We first examine how the helpfulness level of 
reviews written by a reviewer is affected by the 
provision of incentives. The estimation results of our 
DiD model are reported in column (1) of Table 1. We 
can see that the coefficient associated with the variable 
Treat*IncentivizedStatus is insignificant, which 
suggests we do not observe any overjustification 
effect. A probable reason for the lack of 
overjustication effect is that helpfulness is an 
evaluation from peer readers, who may be myopic and 
have no information on whether a reviewer has ever 
received financial incentives in the past. Therefore, 
they evaluate the helpfulness of the reviews only based 
on the current review text without considering any 
prior incentives. We are also interested in the sum of 
the coefficient associated with IncentivizedReview and 
the coefficient associated with the interaction term 
Treat*IncentivizedStatus, which is significantly 
negative. Recall that the sum of these two coefficients 
captures the crowding-out effect due to incentive 
provision. This means that, as the reviewer’s altruistic 
and intrinsic motivations are crowded out by the 
presence of external incentive, the review helpfulness 
decreases significantly. This result suggests that the 
seller’s strategy to provide reviewers with incentives 
can lead to reviewers contributing reviews that are less 
helpful. Note that the coefficient of Treat is 
insignificant, which indicates there is no significant 
difference between the treatment and control group 
prior to incentive provision. This suggests that our 
PSM procedure successfully matched treat users with 
comparable control users in terms of review 
helpfulness before ‘treatment start date’. In summary, 
hypothesis H1a is supported while H2a is not. 
 
5.2. Lexical Richness Model 
Here we consider another quality metric, lexical 
richness. Recall that a higher level of lexical richness 
is usually linked with better writing quality since it 
allows the writer to express more complex ideas. As 
shown in column (2) of Table 1, the estimation results 
show that the sum of the coefficient associated with 
IncentivizedReview and the coefficient associated with 
the interaction term Treat*IncentivizedStatus is 
significantly negative2, which suggests that there is a 
significant crowding-out effect due to incentive 
5605
8 
 
provision. This leads to a significant decrease in 
lexical richness, an indicator of review quality. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1b is supported. In addition, 
the coefficient associated with the interaction term, 
Treat*IncentivizedStatus, is also significantly 
negative, which suggests there is also a negative 
overjustification effect, and hypothesis H2b is 
supported. This implies that an earlier incentive would 
negatively affect the reviewer’s subsequent review 
quality once the incentive has been removed. 
 
5.3. Topic Diversity Model 
Next we examine how incentive provision would 
affect topic diversity, a measure of the review content.  
As can be seen in column (3) in Table 4, the sum of 
the coefficients associated with IncentivizedReview 
and Treat*IncentivizedStatus turns out to be 
significantly positive, which implies that the topic 
diversity is affected by the provision of incentives. In 
other words, when reviewers are provided with 
incentives, they would on average discuss more topics 
in the review texts. Therefore, hypothesis H1c is 
supported. Note that we would not have observed any 
significant result had the incentive provision had no 
effect on the review content.  On the other hand, the 
coefficient of the interaction term 
Treat*IncentivizedStatus is insignificant, and hence 
hypothesis H2c is not supported. As described above, 
topic diversity is measured through LDA, which 
summarizes the topics based on a corpus, i.e., the 
entire set of review texts in our situation. The 
aggregation on the huge dataset may lead to 
information loss of the fine-grained topics specific to 
each review text. We plan to explore different metrics 
in order to improve the evaluation of information 
diversity that each reviewer contributes in his/her 
review texts.
 
Table 1. Estimation results of DiD model
Variables 
(1) 
Helpful 
Ratio 
(2) 
Lexical 
Richness 
(3) 
Topic 
Diversity 
Treat -0.0579 (0.0444) 
-0.0085 
(0.0068) 
0.0070 
(0.0054) 
IncentivizedStatus -0.3370
*** 
(0.0459) 
0.0062 
(0.0042) 
-0.003 
(0.0036) 
IncentivizedReview -0.0812
*** 
(0.0260) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0048** 
(0.0021) 
Treat*IncentivizedStatus 0.0487 (0.0508) 
-0.0138** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0046 
(0.0049) 
ReviewLength 0.2390
*** 
(0.0494) 
-0.0529*** 
(0.0094) 
0.12*** 
(0.0062) 
NumReviews -0.0641
*** 
(0.0150) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0016) 
ActiveMonths 8.88E-4
* 
(5.30E-4) 
-2.79E-5 
(6.63E-5) 
-1.3E-4*** 
(4.97E-5) 
TotalVote 0.0146
*** 
(4.82E-3)     
Entropy 0.0582 (0.0777)     
LexicalRichness 0.6760 (0.6330)     
Constant -3.7970
*** 
(0.5890) 
0.4300*** 
(0.1310) 
0.9420*** 
(0.0772) 
ReviewerCharacteristics YES YES YES 
ProductCharacteristics YES YES YES 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459 0.426 0.496 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Individuals’ pro-social behaviors are a result of 
altruistic and selfish motivations. Researchers from 
various disciplines have started to examine how these 
motivations interact with each other. A particularly 
interesting question is how external incentives would 
influence individuals’ pro-social behavior. A better 
understanding of this issue will be beneficial for 
academics and practitioners hoping to promote pro-
social behaviors and improve social welfare.  Pro-
social behaviors are also an integral part of many 
popular information systems, such as YouTube, 
Wikipedia, Yelp, and even the Amazon review 
platform. These platforms rely heavily on user’s 
voluntary contribution in the form of user-generated 
content to sustain their growth. Some platforms have 
tried to provide external incentives in the hope that 
users will increase their contribution level in response 
to external incentives.  Therefore, it is important that 
we understand the effect and implication of such 
incentive provision on users’ contribution behavior. 
Using a large data set of Amazon product reviews, 
we designed a quasi-experimental setup where we 
combined the propensity score matching (PSM) 
method with a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
approach. To capture the review’s writing style and 
quality, we applied techniques from linguistics, 
language processing, and machine learning to innovate 
novel measures which reflect the structure and 
semantics of review texts. We then proposed a 
comprehensive empirical framework to analyze 
reviewers’ behavior changes using these innovative 
measures. With these measures, we proposed and 
estimated a series of fixed-effect difference-in-
differences models to examine how incentive 
provision influences reviewer’s contribution behavior.   
Our analysis uncovered the short-term and the 
long-term effects, i.e. crowding-out effect and 
overjustification effect, respectively, of incentive 
provision on the reviewer’s contribution behavior. We 
argued that these changes can be explained by the fact 
that the external incentives might have implicitly 
shifted an individual’s decision-making context from 
a pro-social environment to an incentive-based 
environment. The salience of incentives then greatly 
reduced the person’s original altruistic and intrinsic 
motivations. Our results also suggested that we can 
observe a long-term change in behavior: this is 
because once a reviewer has been given some 
incentives, his/her mindset change can persist over 
time to also affect his/her future behaviors, even if the 
incentive has been removed. In summary, these results 
imply that the platform and the sellers should carefully 
evaluate whether or not an introduction of incentives 
will be beneficial for the long-term development of the 
platform, since it is likely to crowd out users’ initial 
altruistic and intrinsic motivations and also lead to a 
long-term overjustification effect. A careless 
provision of incentives might turn out to be harmful 
for the platform in the long run and might discourage 
users’ voluntary pro-social behaviors. 
Our research extends the review literature by 
exploring the short-term and long-term effects of 
incentives on altruistically and intrinsically motivated 
behaviors, and we believe our research will be of 
interest to academics and practitioners hoping to 
promote pro-social behaviors on information systems 
platforms and beyond. Although our research is not 
without limitations, we hope this paper can serve as a 
starting point and encourage more researchers to study 
the issue of voluntary and pro-social behaviors, as well 
as how external incentives would affect the short-term 
and long-term user behavior, perhaps through an 
experimental setting so as to further strengthen the 
causal arguments presented in this paper. 
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